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Abstract—The security of cyber-physical systems is first and
foremost a safety problem, yet it is typically handled as a
traditional security problem, which means that solutions are
based on defending against threats and are often implemented too
late. This approach neglects to take into consideration the context
in which the system is intended to operate, thus system safety
may be compromised. This paper presents a systems-theoretic
analysis approach that combines stakeholder perspectives with
a modified version of Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and
Process (STAMP) that allows decision-makers to strategically
enhance the safety, resilience, and security of a cyber-physical
system against potential threats. This methodology allows the
capture of vital mission-specific information in a model, which
then allows analysts to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in
the locations most critical to mission success. We present an
overview of the general approach followed by a real example
using an unmanned aerial vehicle conducting a reconnaissance
mission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Assessing the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) has
long been handled in the same manner as that of software
security: that is to identify and address individual component
threats. These threats are often identified by analysts using
a variety of threat detection methodologies. However, it has
become increasingly common, when dealing with complex
coupled systems, that vulnerabilities are only identified during
forensic analysis after a security breach [1], [2] or even after
detrimental effects have already taken place [3]. This issue is
particularly concerning in the realm safety-critical CPS, where
such security breaches can put human lives in immediate danger.
This is the case due to the intrinsic interaction between software-
oriented control and the physical world in CPS, where the lines
between the fields of safety and security become blurred, such
that it is necessary to consider them as a single entity when
trying to ensure the successful and safe operation of CPS.
An important metric that has often been neglected in the
security of CPS is the specific mission, i.e., expected service,
that it is intended to perform. Traditional analysis methods are
mission-agnostic, vulnerabilities are viewed in the context of
whether or not security is breached, regardless of the magnitude
of the breach’s effect on its mission requirements or possible
unacceptable outcome later on. By creating a mission-aware
analysis, the steps towards mitigating a vulnerability are taken
in a manner that prioritizes the outcome of the mission. This not
only includes traditional security solutions, but also resiliency
solutions. Resiliency in the context of CPS refers to the ability
of the system to continue to provide the expected service
despite cyber attacks or other disturbances. This means that
on the one end, a vulnerability may be ignored if it has no
effect on mission outcome while on the other end, classes
of vulnerabilities that could potentially disrupt the mission of
the CPS might require extensive preemption and mitigation
strategies.
This approach to CPS cyber-security is born out of the
need to assure the successful mission of military systems such
as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), smart munitions, and
other vehicles against adversaries with varying capabilities.
For example, a small, hand-launched UAV used for tactical
reconnaissance in Iraq likely has significantly fewer threats to
mission success than that of a large, strategic reconnaissance
UAV used against a nation-state. This concept extends to non-
military systems as well. Autonomous vehicles have major
security concerns, but the security needs may differ based on
the mission it is assigned to perform. In civilian applications, an
autonomous highway vehicle might have far greater potential
for harming others than an autonomous farming vehicle
collecting produce, thus the measures taken to secure each
vehicle should differ accordingly. This strategy allows for
informed security decisions, especially in resource-limited
scenarios, and prevents securing a system from becoming
unmanageable.
With the concepts mentioned above in mind, we propose a
new, top-down analysis and modeling methodology that takes
a mission-centric viewpoint to safety and security of CPS. This
methodology combines inputs from system experts at the design
and user levels utilizing Systems-Theoretic Accident Model
and Process (STAMP) [4] to identify potentially hazardous
states that a CPS can enter and reason about how transitioning
into those states can be prevented. By focusing on the intended
mission, this methodology can be applied to both existing and
yet-to-be designed systems, which allows for security analysis
to occur earlier in the design cycle. According to Figure 1
on the following page, this allows for security solutions to
have both greater impact on performance and reduced cost
of implementation. Additionally, this proactive, data-driven
approach is in contrast to the reactive, “whack-a-mole” style
of other security strategies.
The proposed approach consists of two main parts. The
first, termed the War Room, is an elicitation exercise with the
main stakeholders of the mission that serves to gather mission
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Fig. 1. Decision effectiveness during life cycle (adapted from [6]).
goals, objectives, expectations, and procedures. By eliciting
information from both the designers and users of the system,
we attempt to minimize the disconnects between the design and
actual implementation or use of the system. The second part
consists of a modeling phase, which utilizes the information
collected in the War Room. Specifically, the modeling phase
utilizes systems and control theory to formalize the natural
language outputs of the War Room and connect the abstract,
mission-level information to concrete, hardware or software
elements of the system. The resulting model can then be used
for qualitatively identifying vulnerabilities and acting on them,
or as a building block for more quantitative vulnerability and
threat analysis.
The contributions of this paper are:
• a new analysis methodology that incorporates stakeholder
perspectives to give a mission-centric viewpoint to en-
hancing the safety, security, and resiliency of a particular
CPS;
• a modeling technique that captures the behavior of the
CPS within its mission; and
• a concrete application to a real-world CPS and its
corresponding mission.
II. MISSION-CENTRIC CYBERSECURITY
The information carried out by both the War Room and
the STPA-Sec hazard analysis not only assist us in facilitating
systematic requirements and model development but, also, allow
us to secure system’s more effectively by being aware of their
mission-level requirements. For one, by going through the
methodology above we are not blindly securing subsystems but,
rather, we distill to the subsystems that are important toward a
mission goal. Then, we can erect barriers in those subsystems
that can assure, within error, the successful mission because
we have addressed the possible insecure controls that can lead
to unsafe behavior. This benefit becomes more apparent when
we deal with multiple complex system’s that coordinate with
each other to achieve mission success.
Traditionally, there is no “science” to applying security as
a structured assistant to mission success. Indeed, it is often
true that the procedure of securing mission-critical system’s
is based upon an unstructured and ultimately random security
assessment that might or might not lead to mission degradation
(see policy lists). This is problematic because security should
not be exercised for the sake of security but, in general,
should be used as a tool to avoid possible transitioning to
states that violate the system’s expected service. Avoiding
this transitioning to hazardous states is the raison d’eˆtre of
security. Following that definition, any security measure that
goes beyond providing assurance of safe behavior or any
measure that doesn’t adequately assure the safe behavior of
the system during a mission is a loss of resources and, hence,
can inadvertently be a hindrance in the command and control
of military systems.
III. THE WAR ROOM
Similar to the manner in which a group of generals might
plan a military operation around a large table in a meeting room,
our so-called War Room aims to gather as much information
as possible about a mission and the use of a CPS within that
mission. This includes the objectives, success criteria, material
needs, and other similar information about a mission in general,
as well as the particular role a CPS would have during that
mission. This exercise is completed by an analyst team leading
a structured discussion with a range of stakeholders relevant
to the CPS and mission. The main products are outlined in
Figure 2 on the next page and include a detailed, natural
language description of the mission, a concept of operations
(ConOps) specific to the CPS’s use in that mission, a list of
functions or components that are critical to mission-success, and
insights about unacceptable, hazardous, or undesirable events or
outcomes with respect to the mission. This information serves
as the basis for the second step of our proposed methodology;
however, it is extremely valuable on its own for guiding future
cybersecurity solutions.
A. Conducting the War Room
A key tenet to our approach is bringing together the system’s
stakeholders that can better inform the use, operation, and
requirements of the mission and, consequently, the desired
behavior of the system itself. For a military CPS, these
stakeholders include system designers, military commanders,
military operators, maintenance technicians, and potentially
other personnel that might hold pertinent information to the
success of the mission.
By discussing with the stakeholders of the mission, we are
gaining an important understanding about the expectations, re-
quirements, world-views, and interactions that each stakeholder
has with the system. Since each stakeholder has a different
role and area of expertise, the differing views on how the
system operate and perform give more well-rounded insights
and context to how a system will be used as part of a larger
mission.
The analyst team is responsible for leading the discussion
between the stakeholders. It is their duty to guide topics and
ask specific questions that provide the information needed to
Mission 
Identification
Unacceptable 
Losses
Possible 
Hazards
Possible
Control
Actions
Unsafe
Control
Actions
Structured
Discussion w/ 
Stakeholders
Concept of
Operations
System
Functions &
Architecture
Undesirable
Events
War Room
STPA-Sec
Safety
Constraints
Fig. 2. Concept view of how the War Room facilitates the STPA-Sec analysis.
construct a full model of the mission and CPS. The analysts
should ensure that they have a clear understanding of the
basic architecture, function, and purpose of the mission and
CPS before moving on to the next phase of the discussion
process. The analysts should obtain a list of the mission goals,
sub-goals, success criteria, and reasons for mission failure.
Additionally, the analysts should consult with the mission
planners on what may constitute an unacceptable outcome
of the mission. For example, an unacceptable outcome could
include collateral damage in an air strike mission or a failure
to gather information in a surveillance mission. By listing out
the unacceptable outcomes of the mission, we begin to develop
a sense of mission critical functions, objectives, and actions.
After the analyst team gathers the more general information
described above, the next step is to challenge the stakeholders’
routines, expectations, and experiences with both the CPS and
the mission. The analysts should ask questions, based on the
previously gathered information, about what the stakeholder
may do if a particular situation arises during the mission. For
example, an analyst may ask the CPS operator what he or
she might do if the CPS lost functionality during the mission.
The purpose of asking these questions is two-fold: to get the
stakeholders to think about how they may or may not be able
to adapt to losses in functionality due to cyber events or other
causes, and to further develop an understanding of the critical
aspects of the mission and CPS. The answers to these questions
can highlight potential oversights in the mission or the CPS,
as well as further inform the construction of the model in the
next steps of the methodology.
After the War Room is completed, the logs of the discussions
contain vast amounts of information that is difficult to use on its
own. Consequently, it is necessary to organize that information
into a more formal form, which can allow for direct analysis
of the mission and CPS, in addition to providing the structure
for later models used for automated vulnerability analysis.
IV. STAMP & STPA-SEC
To increase the interpretability of the information collected
in the War Room, we propose using a modified version of
STPA-Sec [7], which is itself derived from STAMP [4].
System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)
is an accident causality model that captures accident causal
factors including organizational structures, human error, design
and requirements flaws, and hazardous interactions among non-
failed components [4]. In STAMP, system safety is reformulated
as a system control problem rather than a component reliability
problem—-accidents occur when component failures, external
disturbances, and/or potentially unsafe interactions among
system components are not handled adequately or controlled.
In STAMP, the safety controls in a system are embodied in
the hierarchical safety control structure, whereby commands or
control actions are issued from higher levels to lower levels and
feedback is provided from lower levels to higher levels. STPA-
Sec is an analysis methodology based on the STAMP causality
model, which is used to identify cyber vulnerabilities [7].
By using this framework, we are able to capture the relevant
information from the War Room in a systems-theoretic model
of the mission and the CPS. This model systematically encodes
the unacceptable outcomes of the mission, the hazardous states
that can lead to those outcomes, and the control actions and
circumstances under which those actions can create hazardous
states. This information can be modeled from the mission-
level all the way down to the hardware and component level,
which allows for full top-to-bottom and bottom-up traceability.
This traceability allows us to evaluate the cascading effects of
specific changes to hardware, software, the order of operations,
or other similar events on the potential outcome of a mission.
Consequently, we can then use this information to identify and
evaluate vulnerable areas in a system and take steps to mitigate
or eliminate those vulnerabilities.
A. Constructing the Model
The STPA-Sec model identifies how security issues can lead
to accidents or unacceptable losses. In particular, the model
outlines the behavior of the CPS and other actors within the
overall mission and how that behavior can become unsafe. The
general process for creating the STPA-Sec model is outlined
in Figure 2 on the preceding page.
The first step of building the model is identifying the mission
to be performed, which was explicitly defined in the War
Room. This statement takes the form of, “The mission is to
perform a task, which contributes to higher-level missions
or other purposes.” The specific language used here serves
to succinctly and precisely outline the general purpose and
function of the mission. After defining the mission, the next
step is to define the unacceptable outcomes or losses associated
with the mission. For example, an armed UAV conducting a
strike mission may have an unacceptable loss defined as any
friendly casualties occurring. These losses or outcomes were
either explicitly or implicitly identified and prioritized by the
War Room stakeholders. For example, the failure to destroy
a target may be less important to mission commanders than
inflicting friendly casualties.
After defining the unacceptable losses, we define a set
of hazardous scenarios that could potentially result in an
unacceptable outcome. Some of these scenarios may have
been described in the War Room; however, it is likely that
many will be defined by the analysts on their own. For example,
in the UAV mission and unacceptable loss described above,
a hazardous scenario might be that friendly forces are within
the targeting area. This on its own does not necessarily lead
to the unacceptable loss of friendly casualties, but such an
outcome is certainly a possibility if the munition is in fact
launched. The set of hazardous scenarios does not have to be
an exhaustive list; however, the analysts should strive to define
a set of hazards that have a reasonable chance of occurring
during a mission.
After defining the set of hazards, the analysts shall outline a
functional hierarchy and the control actions that can be taken
at each level during the mission. For example, in a typical
mission, there might be three functional levels or actors: the
mission planner, the system operator, and the physical system.
Obviously, the defined functional levels depend on how the
analysts define them and can vary depending on the system in
question, yet this step is necessary as it allows us to scope the
model to a reasonable degree of granularity. Next, the analysts
define the control actions that can be taken at each level. A
generic control loop is presented in Figure 3. In general, the
control action at one functional level enacts a change onto a
controlled process at a lower level via an actuator and then the
controller receives feedback from the controlled process via a
sensor. For example, a control action in the mission planning
functional level could be defining a flight plan for an unmanned
reconnaissance mission, and a control action at the operator
level in the same mission might be commanding the vehicle
to make a 30 degree turn to the north. The control actions and
functional levels should be represented in a flow diagram that
represents the planned order with respect to the mission. This
will help analysts establish the “baseline” order of operations
and procedures during the mission, which can be used later to
analyze deviations from standard operating procedure.
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Fig. 3. Control Loop with generic entities (adapted from [8])
After defining the control actions within a mission, the next
step is to define the circumstances in which a particular control
action could be unsafe. These circumstances can generally be
defined as being a part of one of the four following categories:
• not providing a control action causes a hazard;
• providing the control action causes a hazard;
• the control action is performed at the incorrect time or
out of order;
• the control action is applied for too long or stopped too
soon.
For example, in the reconnaissance mission described above,
the turning control action could be unsafe when it is applied for
too long and causes the aircraft to stall out. For each control
action, the analysts should identify a circumstance for each of
the four categories mentioned above in which the control action
would be unsafe. These unsafe control actions are placed into
a table, which then allows us to easily pull information when
needed during the next phase of analysis.
B. Using the Model
At the beginning of this process, several unacceptable
outcomes of the mission are identified and prioritized. The
next step is to identify (a) how those losses may occur and
then (b) how they can be avoided or mitigated.
In the previous step, the circumstances under which control
actions would become unsafe were identified. Now, those
circumstances are used to derive security requirements and
constraints on the behavior of the system. For example, a
constraint in the UAV strike mission mentioned previously
could be “no fire munition command shall be issued when
friendly forces are in the targeting area.” These constraints may
or may not already be reflected in the operational procedures
of the system, but if not, then they can be used to guide
any changes made to better ensure the safe operation of the
cyber-physical system in a particular mission.
Finally, we can identify causal scenarios using all of the pre-
viously defined information to determine how an unacceptable
loss may occur. Using the UAV strike mission as an example,
an unacceptable loss can occur when the operator issues a fire
munition command when there are friendly forces within the
target area because his or her sensors indicated otherwise.
Such a scenario could feasibly be the result of a simple
Denial-of-Service Attack on the operator’s sensor. By creating
these causal scenarios, we seek to determine the most likely
or most damaging pathways for potential security breaches.
Furthermore, creating the STPA-Sec model helps identify the
most critical components, features, or functionality in a system
with respect to mission success. This information can then be
used to guide which cyber-security or cyber-resiliency measures
are implemented in the future.
V. APPLICATION OF APPROACH
This methodology is demonstrated by analyzing an
intelligence-gathering mission using a small reconnaissance
UAV. The results and outputs of the analysis are included in
this section.
A. War Rooming for the UAV mission
For the UAV mission, the War Room activity included two
commanders who are responsible for planning and organizing
the mission, two system designers with technical expertise for
the UAV, and an analyst leading the War Room exercise.
At the beginning of the exercise, all stakeholders agreed
on a general mission and system description before entering
discussions. The description of the mission is as follows: “The
tactical reconnaissance mission is to obtain visual information
on the activities or resources, or lack thereof, of an enemy
within a particular area to support other on-going or planned
operations.” The subsequent system description is defined
as “The tactical reconnaissance UAV carries an imaging
payload to observe an area of interest and transmit the video
feed to the appropriate decision-makers in support of other
on-going operations in the region.” The mission definition
should highlight a need for a particular output and the system
description should highlight how it can provide that output to
the mission. In this case, the reconnaissance mission requires
information about enemy activities in a particular area, and the
UAV can provide that information through visual images by
loitering over the area.
Following the gathering of this general information, the
commanders detailed the criteria for mission success and failure.
Mission success would be completed via the collection and
transmission of a clear, continuous video feed of the area of
interest, regardless of what that video feed displayed. Mission
failure would result from the failure to detect an actual threat
in the area of interest. Furthermore, the military stakeholders
also identified a small set of unacceptable outcomes. First
and foremost, any loss of resources stemming from the
lack of or inaccuracy of information collected during the
reconnaissance mission is unacceptable. Additionally, loss of
classified information or systems as a result of the loss of the
UAV or any collateral damage that occurs as a result of the
loss of the UAV, i.e. a crash, are unacceptable outcomes to the
mission.
Finally, the analyst queried the stakeholders about how some
abnormal scenarios might be handled. These questions generally
take the form of “what if this happens?” Clearly, this is not an
exhaustive approach to identifying possible courses of action in
abnormal scenarios, but the purpose here is to get a general idea
of how the stakeholders may react to losses of functionality in
the CPS. For example, the military commanders indicated that
the reconnaissance mission would fail if no visual information
could be collected by the UAV and that information would
need to be gathered by other methods. These other methods
could involve sending in a team of reconnaissance troops;
so obviously it would be preferable to avoid putting human
lives at risk. The system designers indicated that if the UAV
lost GPS service, then the integrity of the mission would be
compromised, but not necessarily result in mission failure as
the inertial navigation system would take over. In general, for
this particular mission, the loss of video functionality directly
results in mission failure; meanwhile, loss of other functionality,
such as GPS navigation, can result in mission failure, but is
not necessarily an immediate result. This information helps us
prioritize unacceptable losses and hazards when we build the
STPA-Sec model.
B. STPA-Sec Model for a UAV Reconnaissance Mission
The first step in building the STPA-Sec model is to define
the mission and the CPS in the context of its role in the
mission. This system and mission was defined as follows: “A
reconnaissance UAV is a system to gather and disseminate
information and/or data by means of imaging (or other signal
detection) and loitering over an area of interest to contribute
to accurate, relevant, and assured intelligence that supports a
commander’s activities within and around an area or interest.”
This statement is effectively a combination of the War Room
definitions of both the UAV and the mission it performs. The
next step is to identify the unacceptable losses that could occur
during the mission. In this case, this information comes directly
from the War Room. The unacceptable losses are defined in
order of priority in Table I on page 7. Given the tactical nature
of this mission and the small size of the UAV, it is less vital
to be concerned with the loss of the vehicle itself, but rather
the loss of potentially key intelligence from the inability to
survey the area of interest.
Next, following the work flow in Figure 2 on page 3, we
identify a set of hazards, the worst-case environment for that
hazard to occur in, and the unacceptable loss that could result
from that hazard. These hazards are defined in Table II on the
following page. The three hazards listed were determined to
create the greatest threat of resulting in an unacceptable loss.
The War Room indicated that the information collected during
this mission is critical for mission success; therefore, the top
hazards relate to the absence or unreliability of information.
The next step is to identify the generic control actions that
can be taken at different functional levels in the system in
order to provide causal paths to a particular hazard. For this
mission, there were five functional levels defined: Mission-level
requirements or plans, the human operator or pilot, the UAV
autopilot system, the control servos and imaging payload, and
the physical environment in which the UAV operates. At each
level, there are a set of control actions that can be taken to
influence the behavior of the surrounding levels, apart from
the physical environment, which only provides disturbances to
the control structure. This generic structure is represented in
Figure 4. For example, at the mission-level a commander will
designate the area of interest for the reconnaissance mission,
which feeds into the actions that the pilot takes to satisfy
that requirement, and so on. For each control action, there is
a scenario in which one of the four types of unsafe control
actions creates at least one of the hazards identified in Table II
on the following page. A subset of these control actions and
circumstances are outlined in Table III on the next page.
Now that we have identified the control actions available
in the system and the conditions under which they create
hazardous scenarios, we can identify a set of constraints that
can be applied to the behavior of the system to limit the
possibility of a hazardous scenario leading to an unacceptable
loss. The constraints defined for the control actions outlined
in Table III on the following page is presented in Table IV on
the next page.
In addition to the constraints that should be applied on the
system, analysis of the STPA-Sec model identifies areas that
should receive the most attention in order to increase security
and resiliency against cyber attacks that can produce unaccept-
able mission outcomes. For the UAV reconnaissance mission
identified in this example, the most pressing unacceptable
outcome relates to military commanders not receiving vital
information about potential enemy activity within an area of
interest. In this case, the integrity of the video feed coming
from the UAV should receive top priority. Developing and
evaluating measures for ensuring integrity of the video feed
(or assuring that the system can identify when integrity has
been lost) is outside of the scope of this paper.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Cybersecurity generally follows a software-oriented perspec-
tive. Mead and Woody present state-of-the-art methods for
software assurance in [9], and focus on integrating security
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Fig. 4. A hierarchical controls model that defines the expected service of a
UAV. Each level is defined by a generic control structure. Inadequate control
in each level can cause an adversarial action to degrade the expected service
and produce a hazardous state.
earlier in the acquisition and development cycle of software.
Furthermore, Mead, Morales, and Alice describe an approach
that uses existing malware to inform the development of
security requirements in the early stages of the software
lifecycle [10]. This approach seeks a similar product to the one
presented in this paper; however, it follows the standard, bottom-
up approach of identifying threats and generating solutions
based on those threats. These techniques work well for IT
software systems, yet are insufficient for cyber-physical systems.
Hu asserts in [11] that these cybersecurity approaches are
not effective for CPS as an attack on a physical system is
not necessarily detectable or counteracted by cyber systems.
Burmester et al define a threat modeling framework specifically
for CPS that takes into account the physical component of
CPS that many other methods do not [12], yet this approach
still relies on historical threats to identify vulnerabilities.
STPA-Sec [7], however, aims to reverse the tactics-based
bottom up approach of other cybersecurity methodologies.
While we seek to address the same issue, our implementation
of STPA-Sec differs in two key areas. First, the implementation
presented by Young and Leveson is a methodology to be per-
formed by analysts on their own, whereas our implementation
is informed explicitly by mission and system stakeholders
via the concept of the War Room. This aids the STPA-Sec
analysis by minimizing the chance of outputs not matching the
perspectives and experiences of the stakeholders. Second, the
Table I
UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES FOR A UAV RECONNAISSANCE MISSION.
Unacceptable Loss Description
L1 Loss of resources, e.g., human, mate´riel, due to inaccurate, wrong, or absent information
L2 Loss of classified or otherwise sensitive technology, knowledge, or system(s)
L3 Loss of strategically valuable mate´riel, personnel, or civilians due to loss of control of system(s)
Table II
HAZARDS THAT CAN CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES.
Hazard Worst-case Environment Associated Losses
H1—Absence of information Imminent threat goes undetected L1: Manpower, mate´riel, territory, etc.
H2—Wrong or inaccurate information Threat is incorrectly identified or
characterized
L1: Manpower, mate´riel, territory, etc.
H3—Loss of control in unacceptable area UAV is lost in enemy territory
and suffers minimal damage in
crash/landing
L2, L3: Compromise of critical systems,
intelligence, and/or other potentially
classified information or technology
Table III
HAZARD ACTIONS.
Control Action Not Providing
Causes Hazard
Providing
Causes Hazard
Incorrect Timing
or Order
Stopped Too Early
or Applied Too Long
CA 1.1
Designate area of interest
H1: No information col-
lected
H1, H2: Area is wrong
or will not provide needed
information
H1, H2: Area designated
is no longer of use
H1, H2: Area would be
useful at another time
CA 1.2
Specify surveillance target
H1, H2: Surveillance is not
focused and provides too
little or too much informa-
tion
H1, H2: Target is wrong
or does not provide needed
information
H1, H2: Target is no longer
of interest or does not pro-
vide needed information
H1: Needed information
occurs before or after
surveillance
CA 1.3
Indicate type of intelligence needed
H1, H2: Gather too much
or too little data to be
useful
H1, H2: Intelligence type
is appropriate for what is
needed
H1, H2: Type of intelli-
gence collected at wrong
time, i.e., SIGINT during
time with no signals
H1: Miss desired type of
intelligence
CA 1.4
Create rules of flight or engagement
H3: UAV strays into inap-
propriate area
H1, H2: UAV cannot col-
lect needed information
H1, H2: Needed informa-
tion not collected
H1, H2: Needed informa-
tion not collected
Table IV
SAFETY CONSTRAINTS.
Control Action Safety Constraint
CA 1.1
Designate Area of Interest
The mission planner shall clearly define the area of interest to be
congruent with or a superset of the area of operations of any current
or future mission for which reconnaissance is needed
CA 1.2
Specify Surveillance Target
The mission planner shall indicate a specific target for the reconnais-
sance
CA 1.3
Indicate type of intelligence needed
The mission planner shall designate a specific type of intelligence that
the mission is going to collect
CA 1.4
Create Rules of Flight or Engagement
The mission planner shall indicate a specific set of rules of engagement
to prevent confusion at the operational level
approach presented in this paper introduces a mission-aware
viewpoint to the STPA-Sec analysis. That is, one could have the
exact same CPS in a completely different mission context, and
would potentially want to choose different security solutions.
The incorporation of the mission into the analysis scopes
the security problem above the cyber-physical system level,
which both opens up possibilities for potential vulnerability
solutions, and motivates the choice of security or resiliency-
based solutions.
VII. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a systems approach to augmenting
security and resiliency in cyber-physical systems. This frame-
work is based on a top-to-bottom identification of unacceptable
losses or outcomes to a particular mission that the CPS
performs and examines how the paths to those outcomes can
be avoided. We have shown an application of this approach to
a hypothetical tactical reconnaissance mission using a small
UAV and generated a set of constraints that should be present
in the behavior of this example system to avoid pathways to
unacceptable outcomes. In addition, this approach identifies
the areas most critical to mission success as starting points for
future implementations of security or resiliency solutions.
A future direction based on the findings of this work includes
implementing the identified system constraints on model and
formally checking that they can avoid unacceptable losses to
the mission. Additionally, this work could be extended by
closing the loop and testing security or resiliency solutions’
effects on the behavior of the system in its mission. This would
allow security and resiliency solutions to be evaluated based
on their cost, complexity of implementation, and effectiveness
at preventing unacceptable mission outcomes.
Through this work, we have identified an approach to
reversing the traditional bottom-up nature of other security
methodologies based on a mission-aware viewpoint. This
approach recognizes that security is a hard and complex
problem, but seeks to manage the costs and complexity of
increasing security and resiliency by focusing on avoiding
unacceptable losses rather than reacting to threats as they
appear.
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